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Institutional Religious Exemptions: A Balancing 
Approach 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“Whether and when to exempt religious practices from 
regulation is the most fundamental religious liberty issue in the 
United States today.”1 The debate concerning exemptions for 
religious individuals from neutral, generally applicable laws is 
longstanding,2 and the debate over exemptions for church-affiliated 
organizations and other religious institutions (“institutional 
exemptions”) has gained increased media and legal attention in the 
past few years. Controversy has escalated with the Supreme Court’s 
formal recognition of a “ministerial exemption” to federal 
antidiscrimination laws3 and with a limited religious exemption to 
the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) 
contraceptive mandate.4 Proponents of institutional exemptions 
argue that exemptions are necessary to protect religious freedom and 
autonomy; without them, the government unjustifiably intrudes into 
the sphere of religion by regulating private behavior in ways that 
jeopardize free exercise rights.5 By protecting religious institutions’ 
right to self-governance, proponents argue, institutional exemptions 
protect religious freedom for individuals.6 Professor Mary Ann 
Glendon, for example, opines that the HHS mandate “is a grave 
 
 1. Douglas Laycock, The Religious Exemption Debate, 11 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 
139, 145 (2009). 
 2. See, e.g., Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical 
Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514, 1514–15 
(1979). 
 3. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 
707 (2012). 
 4. The mandate, finalized and rendered effective in August 2013, requires employers 
who offer health plans to “provide contraceptive coverage” but exempts “religious employers” 
from this requirement. 45 C.F.R. 147.130. 
 5. See, e.g., Eileen P. Kelly & Thomas E. Kelly, A Retrospective on Public Policy Threats 
to Religious Liberty in the Workplace, 17 CATH. SOC. SCI. REV. 241, 241–42 (2012) (arguing 
that Catholic institutions have been increasingly under attack by generally applicable secular 
law and public policy that contravenes Catholic morality). 
 6. See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and 
Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2009). 
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violation of religious freedom” because it does not contain an 
adequate religious exemption.7 
Critics of institutional exemptions, on the other hand, contend 
that broad exemptions may unjustifiably authorize religious 
organizations to violate civil rights laws.8 Because religious groups 
may sometimes “exert, on the individual, oppressive and coercive 
power,” exemptions may undermine individuals’ rights by 
sanctioning the institutions’ use of coercive power.9 Some have 
argued that institutional exemptions amount to undue preferential 
treatment of religious organizations, which undermines the efficacy 
of law.10 Professor Frederick Mark Gedicks, for example, argues that 
an overly broad exemption to the HHS mandate could subvert 
important Constitutional values such as access to contraceptives.11 
Many believe that the ministerial exemption,12 sanctioned in 
Hosanna-Tabor, licenses church-affiliated institutions to engage in 
harmful, discriminatory practices.13 
 
 7. See, e.g., John Garvey et al., Unacceptable, THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY (Apr. 11, 2012), http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2012/04/Unacceptable-4-11.pdf (arguing that the so-called religious exemption to the HHS 
mandate “is an insult to the intelligence of Catholics, Protestants, Eastern Orthodox 
Christians, Jews, Muslims, and other people of faith and conscience to imagine that they will 
accept an assault on their religious liberty if only it is covered up by a cheap accounting trick”). 
 8. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, Narrative Pluralism and Doctrinal Incoherence in 
Hosanna-Tabor, 64 MERCER L. REV. 405 (2013). 
 9. Laura S. Underkuffler, Thoughts on Smith and Religious-Group Autonomy, 2004 
BYU L. REV. 1773, 1783. 
 10. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty, 
39 PEPP. L. REV. 1159, 1172 (2012). 
 11. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, With Religious Liberty for All: A Defense of the 
Affordable Care Act’s Contraception Coverage Mandate, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y 
(Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Gedicks_-_With_Religious_ 
Liberty_for_All_1.pdf (“That religious liberty is a fundamental constitutional value is not in 
doubt. Access to contraceptives is also a fundamental constitutional liberty.”). 
 12. “The ministerial exemption is a nonstatutory, constitutionally compelled exception 
to the application of employment-discrimination and civil rights statutes to religious 
institutions and their ‘ministerial’ employees. The ministerial exemption . . . generally bars 
inquiry into a religious institution’s underlying motivation for a contested employment 
decision.” Weishuhn v. Catholic Diocese of Lansing, 756 N.W.2d 483, 486 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2008). 
 13. Gedicks, supra note 8, at 405–06. 
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Similar debates in the United States concerning religious 
exemptions have thrived for more than two centuries,14 and the heart 
of the controversy is as old as civil society itself. The debate is rooted 
in the question of how the secular state can permit religious groups 
and individuals to “[r]ender . . . unto Caesar the things which be 
Caesar’s, and unto God the things which be God’s”15 when there is 
disagreement as to which things are Caesar’s. This issue arises when 
separationism fails16—when the jurisdictional spheres of the church 
and state are not distinct but rather overlap in conflicting ways.17 
Exemptions have generally offered a solution to the age-old dilemma 
of how religious freedom and civil law can coexist in an ordered 
society when secular law clashes with what religious believers 
consider a higher moral law.18 
Institutional exemptions are unique, however, in their approach 
to this dilemma. They draw boundaries between the church and state 
domains, carving out areas that are categorically “off limits” for the 
state regardless of their substantive content. Communal standards 
are at issue rather than personal beliefs. Whereas individual 
exemptions depend on proof of a person’s sincerely held religious 
belief in a specific substantive issue,19 institutional exemptions are 
granted more broadly in order to protect a religious group’s right to 
self-governance.20 As Professor Perry Dane has observed, the right to 
 
 14. See, e.g., People v. Philips (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. June 14, 1813), reported in WILLIAM 
SAMPSON, THE CATHOLIC QUESTION IN AMERICA (New York 1813 and photo. reprint 1974) 
(asking when a priest qualifies for a religious exemption). 
 15. Luke 20:25 (King James). 
 16. “Equal Liberty” is an exemption paradigm that thoroughly explores the failure of 
separationism. See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 4, 51–77 (2007). 
 17. Professor Perry Dane has described this phenomenon in depth. Perry Dane, The 
Varieties of Religious Autonomy, in CHURCH AUTONOMY: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY 117 
(Gerhard Robbers ed., 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2307670. 
 18. As Professor Dane puts it, “[t]he most pregnant and emblematic problems in the 
encounter of religion and the state, however, are, it seems to me, essentially jurisdictional. 
They are about the nature of the boundaries between the realms of religion and secular law 
and government, and the nature and degree of deference that each should expect of the 
other.” Id. at 120. 
 19. Sincerity of belief has long been the test for conscientious objector qualification. See, 
e.g., Welsh, II v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 
(1965). 
 20. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 
(2012); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 
483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
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an institutional exemption does not depend on an individual 
“asserting a specific conflict between a secular legal norm and a 
sincerely held religious belief. To the contrary, the right to 
autonomy, correctly understood, attaches to a religious institution 
regardless of its motives and beliefs.”21 Institutional exemptions thus 
fence the government out of whole fields of religious group activity. 
For example, the ministerial exemption, recognized in Hosanna-
Tabor, shields many church-affiliated institutions from anti-
discrimination laws regardless of the group’s religious stance 
on discrimination.22 
Of course, the main difficulty in fencing out the government is 
knowing where to place the stakes. U.S. law forbids the state from 
imposing its own definitive boundaries on the religious sphere.23 Yet 
lines must be drawn. If too narrow a perimeter is drawn, the state 
risks encroaching upon religious autonomy.24 That is, a church may 
lose its vital freedom of self-governance when the state determines 
which activities are religious. Conversely, if the state defers too 
broadly to a group’s definition of religion, the religious group might 
become a law unto itself. The secular government may find itself 
without authority to regulate religious institutions, even when the 
institutional activities at issue are non-religious or undermine the 
public interest. 
Hence the dilemma: institutional exemptions may safeguard 
religious group autonomy, thereby serving as a vehicle for individual 
free exercise,25 but they may also enable institutions to evade 
 
 21. Perry Dane, “Omalous” Autonomy, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1715, 1734 [hereinafter 
Dane, “Omalous”]. Professor Dane’s distinction between “exemption rights” and “autonomy 
rights” is analogous to my distinction between “individual exemptions” and “institutional 
exemptions.” Id. 
 22. The plurality’s closing remarks in Hosanna-Tabor are simply, “[t]he church must be 
free to choose those who will guide it on its way,” implying that what is protected by the 
ministerial exemption is religious group self-governance rather than sincerely held religious 
belief in discrimination. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710. 
 23. See, e.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871); Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary 
Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Torcaso v. 
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
 24. See, e.g., W. Cole Durham, Jr., The Right to Autonomy in Religious Affairs: A 
Comparative View, in CHURCH AUTONOMY: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY 722–24 (Gerhard 
Robbers ed., 2001), available at http://www.strasbourgconsortium.org/content/blurb/ 
files/Chapter%2033.%20Durham.pdf (arguing that religious autonomy is fundamental to free 
exercise). 
 25. See, e.g., Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Has Obama Waged a War on Religion?, NPR 
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important public policy such as antidiscrimination laws, regardless of 
whether free exercise is served.26 It is not then surprising that 
institutional exemptions have gained attention in modern society, as 
governments and churches alike have expanded their reach into new 
social domains.27 Much legal scholarship is devoted to drawing 
jurisdictional boundaries in healthcare, employment, civil rights, and 
First Amendment law.28 It is also not surprising that paradigms of 
institutional exemptions are fairly ad hoc. Exemption literature tends 
to focus on either broad constitutional concerns, overlooking the 
distinction between institutional and individual exemptions,29 or on 
narrow institutional exemptions in a specific field.30 
This Comment expands religious group autonomy theory into a 
paradigm for institutional exemptions that accounts for the civil 
rights of individuals. It articulates a rough balancing test for 
weighing the benefits of exemptions to institutions—namely, the 
protection of religious group autonomy—against the costs to 
individuals—particularly the diminution of personal autonomy and 
other Fourteenth Amendment rights. This balancing test provides a 
 
(Jan. 8, 2012, 6:10 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/01/08/144835720/has-obama-
waged-a-war-on-religion (explaining the view that due to state regulation, “Americans’ 
religious liberties are under attack”). 
 26. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Op-Ed., Is Religion Above the Law?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 
2011, 9:00 PM), available at http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/17/is-
religion-above-the-law (arguing that the ministerial exemption is unjustifiable). 
 27. As Professor Ira Lupu has noted, “[i]n contemporary America, the combination of 
wide-ranging religious pluralism, extending far beyond Protestant Christianity, and the far-
reaching expansion of government has created many more occasions for conflict between 
religious practice and government policy.” Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Forms and 
Limits of Religious Accommodation: The Case of RLIUPA, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1907, 1914 
(2011). 
 28. See, e.g., Kelly Catherine Chapman, Gay Rights, the Bible, and Public 
Accommodations: An Empirical Approach to Religious Exemptions for Holdout States, 100 GEO. 
L.J. 1783 (2012); Georgia L. Holmes & Penny Herickhoff, The First Amendment and The 
Ministerial Exemption: Federal Statutory Mandates, 28 J. APPLIED BUS. RES. 989 (2012); 
Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Religious Tax Exemptions Entangle in Violation of the Establishment 
Clause?: The Constitutionality of the Parsonage Allowance Exclusion and the Religious 
Exemptions of the Individual Health Care Mandate and the FICA and Self-Employment 
Taxes, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1633 (2012); David E. Bernstein, Commentary, The 1964 Civil 
Rights Act is Under Attack Today—from Within, CATO INSTITUTE (Feb. 4, 2004), available at 
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/1964-civil-rights-act-is-under-attack-today-
within. 
 29. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 16. 
 30. See id. 
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principled method for conceptualizing institutional exemptions and 
determining when they might be justified.31 
Part II describes the most fundamental benefits of institutional 
exemptions, while Part III describes the costs. Part IV identifies 
objective criteria for measuring the benefits and costs of institutional 
exemptions in varying contexts. Part V attempts to sketch how these 
objective criteria might apply in specific situations where the 
justifiability of institutional exemptions has been questioned. 
II. BENEFITS OF INSTITUTIONAL EXEMPTIONS 
A. Institutional Exemptions Protect Religious Group Autonomy 
Institutional exemptions are conceptually buttressed by group 
autonomy theory.32 “Group autonomy” in this context refers to a 
religious group’s right to self-governance.33 It is the freedom of a 
church or other religious institution to set its own agenda and 
administer its own affairs.34 It posits that religious liberty for groups 
fosters religious liberty for individuals, and thus implies that 
institutional exemptions are beneficial to individuals and society at 
large.35 A broad approach to autonomy would prohibit almost any 
 
 31. “Procedural fairness” is a common law notion that individuals should be protected 
against arbitrary decisions and actions against them by groups. See, e.g., Palm Med. Grp., Inc. 
v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 266, 274 (2008). I use the term loosely to describe 
the evenhanded and logical constituency that both government and private groups owe 
individuals when dealing with them. 
 32. In the words of Professor Perry Dane, “[w]e might even see institutional autonomy 
as the conceptual kernel around which a defense of exemptions might be built.” Dane, 
“Omalous,” supra note 21, at 1736. 
 33. See, e.g., id. at 1730–40; Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free 
Exercise: The Surprising Lessons of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1633, 1635 (advocating that 
individual free exercise flourishes when religious groups are free to manage their internal affairs 
with minimal state oversight); Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach to Religious 
Doctrine: What Are We Talking About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837 (2009); Richard W. 
Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 
53 VILL. L. REV. 273 (2008) [hereinafter Garnett, Do Churches Matter?]; Richard W. Garnett, 
Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) like the Boy Scouts?, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL 
COMMENT. 515, 530–32 (2007) (suggesting that religious groups, as “First Amendment 
institutions,” may deserve special protection from otherwise valid and generally applicable 
laws); Horwitz, supra note 6, at 81 (arguing that churches deserve nearly absolute freedom 
from government regulation); Laycock, supra note 1, at 145. 
 34. See, e.g., Brady, supra note 33. 
 35. See id. 
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state interference with church affairs, regardless of its nature.36 A 
more moderate approach would permit the government to regulate 
some religious activity if there is a compelling state interest.37 Some 
have also argued that the government should have power to apply 
neutral principles of law in regulating procedural but not substantive 
matters involving religious groups activity.38 
Regardless of the particular approach, group autonomy theory 
fundamentally recognizes the unique nature of religious institutions 
and their relation to religious individuals. Group autonomy theory is 
born of the fact that a church qua church is not constitutionally 
entitled to First Amendment protection but is an indispensible 
component of free exercise.39 Although group autonomy theory fails 
to provide a complete answer to the institutional exemption 
dilemma, it has dealt with difficult institutional problems in a way 
that prevailing exemption paradigms have not.40 Specifically, it 
provides two main justifications for institutional exemptions: (1) 
 
 36. Professor Horowitz, for example, argues that the state has limited jurisdictional 
power to intervene in church affairs and that churches can be trusted to self-regulate. He 
proffers a “sphere sovereignty” theory, which severely constrains government power over 
religious affairs to instances of abuse against church members. See Horwitz, supra note 6. 
 37. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Compelling State Interest: On “Due Process 
of Lawmaking” and the Professional Responsibility of the Public Lawyer, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 
1035 (1994). 
 38. Professor Evans explains that a “procedural fairness” approach to religious 
exemptions empowers courts to regulate religious activity only when it is procedurally unfair to 
an individual. CAROLYN EVANS, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AUSTRALIA: LEGAL PROTECTION OF 
FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF (2011). This protects religious autonomy while protecting 
individuals against arbitrary abuse of power by churches. The European Court of Human 
Rights utilized this approach when it affirmed the LDS Church’s decision to fire its public 
affairs director for having an extra-marital affair. The court did not adjudicate the merits of 
firing the employee, rather it determined simply that the church had dealt fairly with 
employees by giving them notice of religious employment standards. See Obst v. Germany, 
425/03 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng-
press/pages/search.aspx?i=003-3272505-3650095. 
 39. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, Three Questions About Hybrid Rights and Religious 
Groups, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PT. 192 (2008), http://yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-
journal-pocket-part/civil-rights/three-questions-about-hybrid-rights-and-religious-groups/ 
(noting widespread agreement that group rights are constitutionally suspect). 
 40. Some predominant exemption theories, for example Equal Liberty, implicitly 
presume that religious institutions and groups stand on equal Constitutional footing. Equal 
Liberty’s inability to account for the difference between institutional and individual religious 
freedom is manifest by its superficial and limited explanation of why the Boy Scouts of America 
are entitled freedom of association. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 16. Group autonomy 
advocates, on the other hand, do not generally conflate issues of group and individual religious 
rights. 
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religious autonomy is a vehicle for free exercise, and (2) religious 
autonomy fosters healthy pluralism in democratic society.41 
1. Religious autonomy is a vehicle for free exercise 
Institutional exemptions may be necessary to protect free exercise 
rights because personal religious freedom is often exercised via group 
activity.42 People worship in groups. Religious individuals have deep 
and complex relationships with religious groups.43 Individuals find 
strength in numbers and band together to form religious institutions 
that enable them to collectively advance “the kingdom of God.”44 
Moreover, religious institutions, such as churches and schools, 
transmit religious beliefs to individuals. Such institutions help 
develop doctrine, create traditions, preserve beliefs, and advance 
ideas. In other words, “[t]he freedom of religion is not only lived 
and experienced through institutions, it is also protected and 
nourished by them.”45 As Professor Cole Durham has explained: 
[I]ndividual freedom of religion would be impoverished if the 
autonomy of religious organizations were left unprotected. 
Religious communities protect the seedbeds of religious thought 
and belief. They provide the environment within which religious 
ideas and experience can be formed, crystallized, developed, 
transmitted, and preserved. Individual belief would lack its richness, 
its connectedness, and much of its character-building and meaning-
giving power if it were cut off from the extended life of religious 
communities.46 
 
 41. See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 6. 
 42. See, e.g., DURHAM, W. COLE, & BRETT G. SCHARFFS, LAW AND RELIGION: 
NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL, AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (2010) (explaining the 
popular view that religious group autonomy is crucial to the protection of free exercise rights 
because individuals utilize groups to exercise religious belief). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Brady, supra note 33, at 1705. Professor Laycock has also made this argument, 
noting that “[t]here can be no coherent understanding of religious liberty without the right to 
actually practice your religion. When the state says, ‘You can believe whatever you want but 
you can never act on it,’ that is not religious liberty, and it is certainly not the free exercise of 
religion. ‘Exercise,’ now and in the Founders’ time, means actions and conduct.” Laycock, 
supra note 1, at 149. 
 45. Garnett, Do Churches Matter?, supra note 33, at 291–93. 
 46. Durham, supra note 24; see also Brady, supra note 33, at 1677 (“Full freedom of 
belief is not possible without a corresponding right of religious groups to teach, develop, and 
practice their doctrines and ideas.”). 
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Laws that limit institutional autonomy—including general and 
neutral laws without religious exemptions—may end up limiting 
personal religious freedom. Unless churches are ensured an adequate 
legal right “to be left alone,”47 secular antidiscrimination ordinances 
and other laws will be able to coerce religious institutions into giving 
up traditional beliefs and conforming to contemporary social 
norms.48 When the state pigeonholes religious groups into secular 
organizational structures, religious institutions lose power to 
preserve traditional religious orders.49 Ecclesiastic leaders and other 
members of the group are forced “to behave according to . . . the 
standards that attach to those [secular] labels.”50 Individuals within 
the church may become unable to continue time-honored worship 
practices. For example, courts resolving sexual abuse claims against 
the Catholic Church might jeopardize traditional Catholic clericalism 
by pigeonholing ecclesiastical leaders into tort categories.51 Few 
people disagree that the church should face legal repercussions for its 
clergy’s sexual misconduct, but attempts to describe the relationship 
between bishop and priest in terms of respondeat superior may 
jeopardize the freedom of bishops and priests to define their own 
relationships. A more generalized legal rubric of duties specially 
adapted to the church’s clerical order may better preserve autonomy 
and safeguard free exercise.52 
2. Religious autonomy advances democratic goals 
Institutional exemptions may also be socially desirable, according 
to some proponents, because democratic society flourishes when 
state regulation of religion is minimized.53 Religious institutions 
advance the goals of a democratic society by contributing diverse 
viewpoints to the democratic experience. Religious groups are 
“training grounds for the exercise of democratic skills and 
 
 47. Toward a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations 
and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1372, 1376 (1981). 
 48. See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 6, at 119 (arguing that without a ministerial 
exemption, for example, secular antidiscrimination ordinances in employment law would 
penalize religions for not conforming to secular norms). 
 49. Id.; Brady, supra note 33. 
 50. Dane, “Omalous” supra note 21, at 1715. 
 51. Id.; see also Horwitz, supra note 6. 
 52. See Horwitz, supra note 6. 
 53. Brady, supra note 33; see Garnett, Do Churches Matter?, supra note 33. 
DO NOT DELETE 4/14/2014  11:27 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2014 
424 
responsibilities, they are schools for democracy.”54 The American 
political process is thus enriched as religious individuals band 
together in groups to develop their beliefs and contribute to the 
democratic process. 
Churches also provide a sociocultural counterpoint to secularism, 
thereby “protecting alternate visions of social and political life” in a 
pluralist society.55 Like other First Amendment institutions, religious 
groups provide infrastructural support for First Amendment 
freedom.56 By giving religious individuals a collective voice, religious 
groups protect individuals against the state’s oppressive power and 
make free exercise possible. Thus, “religious institutions—healthy, 
independent, free, diverse institutions—are themselves among the 
necessary conditions for religious freedom.”57 
III. COSTS OF INSTITUTIONAL EXEMPTIONS 
“‘Autonomy’ is only the label we attach to one side of a 
necessarily two-sided encounter between normative worlds.”58 
Group autonomy theory merely highlights the benefits of 
institutional exemptions, namely the protection of religious group 
freedom and the systemic advancement of free exercise.59 These 
benefits must be weighed against their costs, namely the social costs 
of letting groups disregard the rules. Although institutional 
exemptions may advance free exercise in some instances, they can, in 
other instances, subvert the individual’s civil rights—especially in 
matters where individuals are vulnerable to oppression by groups. In 
healthcare, employment, and civil rights law especially, exemptions 
from important safeguards against the mistreatment of individuals 
are likely to impose direct burdens on individuals.60 The autonomy 
 
 54. Brady, supra note 33, at 1700–01. 
 55. Id. at 1667. 
 56. See Garnett, Do Churches Matter?, supra note 33. 
 57. Richard W. Garnett, Religious Freedom and (and in) Institutions (Notre Dame 
Legal Studies Paper No. 12-57), in CHALLENGES TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 71 (Gerard V. Bradley ed., 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2027639. 
 58. Dane, supra note 17, at 147. 
 59. Professor Underkuffler has also observed the “tendency, by those who advocate 
religious-group autonomy, to focus on the needs of the target group and its members” 
without considering the needs of complainants. Underkuffler, supra note 9, at 1784. 
 60. Professors Lupu and Tuttle have argued that a fair balancing of rights in the 
exemption dilemma context will consider who bears the cost of the exemption, that is whether 
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justifications for exemptions are weakened in these cases, when 
groups inhibit individuals’ rights to due process and equal 
protection. Exemptions also insulate religious institutions from 
liability for misconduct, religiously motivated or not.61 Exemptions 
can immunize groups from antidiscrimination laws, education 
standards, workplace safety rules, commercial dealings provisions, 
and anticorruption laws, which are all designed to protect individuals 
from abuses of power by groups.62 
A. Group Autonomy Can Hamper Individual Rights 
Institutional exemptions often sacrifice individual rights to 
religious autonomy.63 In resolving perceived conflicts between 
secular and religious norms, exemptions can undermine the state’s 
ability to resolve conflicts between religious institutions and 
individuals. Exemptions can give religious groups freedom to 
trample judicially recognized Fourteenth Amendment rights, 
including the right to self-determination in healthcare matters64 and 
to equal protection in employment law.65 The root of this 
phenomenon is what Professor Gedicks has called “the recurring 
paradox of groups.”66 The paradox is this: “[W]hile groups buffer 
their members from oppressive government action, they also buffer 
them from liberating government action.”67 That is, religious groups 
 
society at large can absorb the cost of exemption or whether it is concentrated on a smaller set 
of individuals. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 27. 
 61. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Recurring Paradox of Groups in the Liberal 
State, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 47 (arguing that too much religious autonomy can negatively shield 
religious groups from liberal influences). 
 62. Professor Underkuffler argues that if religious groups and institutions are granted 
unbridled autonomy, they can disregard an endless list of socially necessary laws. Underkuffler, 
supra note 9, at 1784–85. 
 63. Although not really a paradigm for institutions exemptions per se, Professor 
Underkuffler’s criticism of religious autonomy is fundamental to exemption theory. See id. 
 64. The Supreme Court has long upheld the constitutional principle that “[n]o right is 
held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every 
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or 
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.” Union Pacific R. 
Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891); see also Cruzan by Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dept. 
of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990). 
 65. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 66. Gedicks, supra note 61, at 47. 
 67. Gedicks, supra note 8, at 418 (“When government intervention in group matters 
would enhance individual autonomy, as in the enforcement of antidiscrimination laws, group 
rights that block such intervention subvert individual autonomy.”). 
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can be vehicles for free exercise as well as shelters for intolerance.68 
When group and individual interests are at odds, institutional 
exemptions may simultaneously subvert personal autonomy and 
protect group autonomy. 
At least one poignant example of how this paradox can play out 
involves “conscience clauses” exempting church-affiliated healthcare 
providers from providing emergency contraceptive and abortion 
services.69 While the clauses have obvious church autonomy 
justifications, the following narrative demonstrates how even 
seemingly justifiable institutional exemptions in healthcare law might 
subvert patient autonomy: 
[Kathleen] Prieskorn was three months pregnant and working as a 
waitress when she felt a twinge, felt a trickle down her leg and 
realized she was miscarrying again. 
She rushed to her doctor’s office, where [she] learned [her] 
amniotic sac had torn, . . . But the nearest hospital had recently 
merged with a Catholic hospital—and because [her] doctor could 
still detect a fetal heartbeat, he wasn’t allowed to give [her] a 
uterine evacuation that would help [her] complete [the] 
miscarriage. 
To get treatment, Prieskorn, who has no car, had to instead travel 
80 miles to the nearest hospital that would perform the 
procedure—expensive to do in an ambulance, because she had no 
health insurance. Her doctor handed her $400 of his own cash and 
she bundled into the back of a cab.70 
 
 68. See id. 
 69. A majority of states of have enacted statutes expressly immunizing healthcare 
providers from civil liability for withholding, on religious grounds, certain types of medical 
attention from patients. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-601(a) (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
24, § 1791 (2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.0111(8) (West 2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-
142 (West 2013); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453-16 (West 2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-443 
(West 2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.800 (LexisNexis 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
40:1299.31 (West 2008); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 20-214 (LexisNexis 2009); 
MINN. STAT. § 145.42(1) (2011); MO. ANN. STAT. § 197.032(1) (West 2004); MONT. CODE 
ANN. §50-20-111 (2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-3 (West 2010); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW 
§ 79-i(2) (McKinney 2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-741 (West 2010); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 34-23A-12 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-306(1) (West 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 253.09 (West 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-6-106 (2013). 
 70. Molly M. Ginty, Treatment Denied, MS. MAGAZINE BLOG (May 9, 2011), 
http://msmagazine.com/blog/2011/05/09/treatment-denied/ (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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Kathleen not only incurred unnecessary physical risks due to a 
delay in care,71 but also incurred substantial medical costs when 
institutional standards overshadowed her right as a patient to self-
determination. Troublingly, this is not an isolated example of 
religious group practices swallowing up patient autonomy in 
healthcare law.72 The National Women’s Law Center (“NWLC”) has 
observed that many women have had similar experiences with life-
threatening pregnancies at church-affiliated hospitals.73 In a 
comprehensive study of how Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals 
treat ectopic pregnancies and dangerous miscarriages, the NWLC 
and Ibis Reproductive Health found that many religious healthcare 
institutions routinely fail to meet the governmentally prescribed 
standard of care.74 Both common law and the Federal Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Labor Act require healthcare providers to 
offer prompt emergency care for patients, such as hemorrhaging 
women, who face “material deterioration of their condition” if care 
 
 71. 7 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D Physician’s Failure to Diagnose a Pregnancy § 2 
(2013) (describing the potentially disastrous consequences of medical negligence when a 
woman is miscarrying). 
 72. See Stephane P. Fabus, Religious Refusal: Endangering Pregnant women and 
Professional Standards, 13 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 219 (2012), available at 
http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=elders; 
Tricia K. Fujikawa Lee, Emergency Contraception in Religious Hospitals: The Struggle Between 
Religious Freedom and Personal Autonomy, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 65 (2004); Katherine A. 
White, Crisis of Conscience: Reconciling Religious Health Care Providers’ Beliefs and Patients’ 
Rights, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1703 (1999). 
 73. The National Women’s Law Center initiated a study that was conducted by Ibis 
Reproductive Health, a clinical and social science research organization. Ibis selected a 
sampling of geographically diverse Catholic, non-Catholic and recently merged hospitals. 
Researchers conducted in-depth phone interviews with doctors, asking about their knowledge 
of hospital policies and practices regarding the treatment of ectopic pregnancies and 
miscarriages, as well as their perceptions of how these policies affected their treatment decisions 
and the quality of patient care. NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CENT., BELOW THE RADAR: RELIGIOUS 
REFUSALS TO TREAT PREGNANCY COMPLICATIONS PUT WOMEN IN DANGER (2012) 
[hereinafter NWLC REPORT]. 
 74. The report explains that many doctors interpret the church’s Directives to prohibit 
medically induced abortion of life-threatening pregnancies. Thus, they feel religiously 
obligated and entitled to withhold emergency medical care. Id. at 2–4; see also ANGEL M. 
FOSTER ET AL., ASSESSING HOSPITAL POLICIES & PRACTICES REGARDING ECTOPIC 
PREGNANCY & MISCARRIAGE MANAGEMENT: RESULTS OF A NATIONAL QUALITATIVE STUDY 
(Ibis Reprod. Health, 2009), available at http://www.ibisreproductivehealth.org/news/ 
documents/Summaryofqualitativestudy.pdf. 
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is delayed.75 Yet many Catholic hospitals feel that the church-issued 
Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services 
entitle them to withhold prompt emergency care from women who 
face tubal rupture or other serious complications.76 Whether or not 
conscience clauses or other institutional exemptions are actually 
involved, religious institutions often feel morally entitled to violate 
secular law in order to serve a higher law. Patients, in turn, often lack 
recourse because they do not know the legal standard of care and do 
not know to challenge their providers’ judgment.77 
Clearly, therefore, religious groups can harm individuals. But it is 
also true that many non-religious groups treat individuals badly, and 
subversion of individual rights may merely be an inherent risk of 
institutional groupthink.78 Religious groups in this regard may be 
viewed no differently than any other group. A church-owned 
hospital’s negligent treatment of dangerous pregnancies may be 
attributed to America’s healthcare system problems generally. One 
might consider the religious school in Hosanna-Tabor as “neither a 
church fighting to defend the integrity of its doctrine nor a school 
whose leaders gave vent to a legally prohibited prejudice, but a 
group of ordinary people dealing with the messiness of real life.”79 A 
conflict between a religious employer and an employee concerning 
discrimination in the workplace may be chalked up as just another 
Title VII feud. A religious commercial vendor’s indelicate habit of 
refusing service to customers with certain sexual proclivities may be 
considered foreseeable backlash against state attempts to regulate 
free enterprise. 
 
 75. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2006); see also George v. Travelers Ins. Co. (E.D. La.) 215 F. 
Supp. 340, aff’d, 328 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1964); 7 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D Physician’s 
Failure to Diagnose a Pregnancy § 2 (2013). 
 76. “For example, a Catholic hospital refused to provide the uterine evacuation 
necessary to stabilize a patient having a miscarriage, saying that it would only give her blood 
transfusions as long as there was still a fetal heartbeat. A doctor at a non-sectarian hospital 
finally agreed to accept the transfer of the patient, despite the doctor’s concern that the patient 
was unstable.” NWLC REPORT, supra note 73, at 2. 
 77. NWLC REPORT, supra note 73, at 2 (explaining that women are often unable to 
bring claims against their doctors). 
 78. Social psychologists often refer to “groupthink” as the set of problems “that can 
arise when people with particular worldviews retreat into the safe haven offered by the 
company of those with whom they always agree.” RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC 
STUDY OF RELIGION VOL. 23, ix (Ralph L. Piedmont & Andrew Village eds., 2012). 
 79. Gedicks, supra note 8, at 415. 
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In other words, individuals may be harmed equally by secular 
and religious groups alike. Sometimes the very nature of groups, 
rather than a group’s religious affiliation, accounts for the 
mistreatment of individuals by both secular and religious institutions. 
The difference, however, is the religious group’s ability to rely on its 
religious status to evade the consequences of the law. Whereas courts 
are allowed to scrupulously analyze the mistakes of tortfeasors in 
ordinary discrimination or malpractice situations, institutional 
exemptions preclude judicial inquiry into the wrongdoing of 
religious groups in certain areas of law.80 Because institutional 
exemptions necessarily delineate whole fields of litigation that are off 
limits for courts, they enable religious groups to evade liability for 
wrongdoing by simply raising a religious group autonomy defense. 
This evasion is problematic for at least two reasons. First, it 
implies that exemptions may actually perpetuate systemic 
mistreatment of individuals by religious groups. Classic tort theory 
implies that unless religious institutions are held liable for their 
wrongdoings, they will lack incentive to comply with contemporary 
social and medical standards.81 Second, such non-compliance is 
unjustifiable in situations where the wrongdoing stems from 
religious social norms or mere groupthink rather than actual 
religious conviction.82 The purpose of institutional exemptions is to 
advance free exercise through the vehicle of group rights. Yet this 
purpose is not served when an institution’s actions are not 
 
 80. For example, courts have broadly declined to adjudicate wrongful termination suits 
filed against religious employers. See, e.g., Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 
169, 177 (5th Cir. 2012); Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 
2006); Assemany v. Archdiocese of Detroit, 434 N.W.2d 233 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). 
 81. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987) (describing tort law as a tool for promoting efficient 
behavior). 
 82. The distinction between groupthink and actual religious conviction is nuanced but 
reveals how “the answers to the question ‘when and why is religion good or bad for the 
individual’ vary across context.” Alana Conner Snibbe & Hazel Rose Markus, The Psychology of 
Religion and the Religion of Psychology, 12 PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY 3, 229 (2002). 
Groupthink is “likely to occur when a group: (a) collectively evaluates and rationalizes the 
decisions it makes, (b) promotes uniformity of ideas, (c) assumes a censorship role toward 
outside views, and (d) exclusively selects information that supports their perspectives.” Kari 
O’Grady & Richard York, Theism and Non-Theism in Psychological Science: Towards Scholarly 
Dialogue, in RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION VOL. 23, 286 (Ralph 
L. Piedmont & Andrew Village eds., 2012) (internal citations omitted). Religious conviction, 
on the other hand, involves introspective formulation of personal views coupled with group 
dialogue. See id. 
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attributable to sincerely held religious belief.83 Nor is free exercise 
necessarily advanced when a religious group fails to respect the 
personal beliefs of its individual constituents.84 For example, a 
Catholic hospital may theologically disagree with its Catholic 
employee’s belief that God permits abortion when the mother’s life 
is jeopardized.85 The employee’s freedom to exercise this religious 
belief, by aborting a life-threatening pregnancy, is limited if the 
hospital enjoys an absolute right to limit the employee’s otherwise 
legally appropriate actions. 
IV. THE BALANCING TEST 
Once the true costs and benefits of institutional exemptions are 
identified, the more difficult question is how to objectively measure 
them. Exemptions cover so much legal ground that ad hoc cost-
benefit analyses may seem preferable to a universal balancing test.86 
The balancing act is particularly difficult because each side of the 
scale holds penumbral rights. On the benefits side of the scale, group 
rights stand on tenuous Constitutional grounds.87 The right to 
religious group autonomy is merely implied by a hodgepodge of 
Supreme Court cases.88 Nor, on the costs side, does the text of the 
Constitution expressly guarantee an individual’s right to patient 
autonomy or freedom from discrimination.89 Therefore, the weight 
afforded to each side of the scale can be difficult to determine. The 
 
 83. In Hosanna-Tabor, for example, the church lacked any sincerely held theological 
justification for firing an employee with a medical condition. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm., 132 U.S. 694 (2012). 
 84. Professor Underkuffler has further developed this point. See Underkuffler, supra 
note 9. 
 85. Sister Margaret McBride, devout Catholic and hospital administrator at a Catholic 
hospital, allowed hospital personnel to abort a pregnancy in 2009 when a woman came into 
the emergency room in critical condition. She was severely reprimanded and excommunicated 
from the church. See Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Nun Excommunicated for Allowing Abortion, 
NPR (May 19, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126985072. 
 86. EVANS, supra note 38; Brady, supra note 33. 
 87. “American constitutional rights doctrine is relentlessly individualistic. . . . To the 
limited extent that constitutional doctrine protects group rights, it does so only because such 
protection promotes individual liberty. Second-order group rights exist only to protect first-
order individual rights.” Id. at 193 (emphasis in original). 
 88. Gedicks, supra note 39. 
 89. Many textualists especially have challenged Fourteenth Amendment–derived rights 
as constitutionally suspect. See, e.g., Joan R. Bullock, Abortion Rights in America, 1994 BYU 
L. REV. 63. 
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actual costs and benefits of exemptions can also vary widely in 
different contexts. Nevertheless, some objective indicators of 
personal costs and group benefits can be considered in order to 
achieve procedurally fair results. 
A. Measuring Group Autonomy Benefits 
Again, the core justification for institutional exemptions is that 
they advance free exercise by protecting religious group autonomy. 
On the benefits side of the scale then, lawmakers should measure the 
degree to which an exemption actually serves free exercise through 
its protection of group autonomy. Lawmakers are constitutionally 
prohibited from arbitrarily defining what substantively constitutes 
“important” religious activity “deserving” of exemption90—the 
reason being that a religious institution may legitimately consider 
“even the most mundane and routine” aspects of its affairs religiously 
significant.91 There is, however, no constitutional prohibition on 
objectively observing institutional behavior from the outside. The 
state may look at a group’s actions to determine whether that group 
has positioned itself in society as a self-contained vehicle for free 
exercise. The government may observe from the sidelines whether a 
group chooses to involve itself in public affairs or chooses instead to 
interact with only an exclusive set of religious group members. The 
state may observe objective indicia of self-containment in order to 
distinguish highly public religious institutions from more 
private ones. 
That is, by evaluating the religious exclusivity of various 
religiously affiliated institutions, the state can objectively distinguish 
entities that highly value religious autonomy from entities willing to 
subject themselves to more scrutiny from outsiders. To measure 
religious exclusivity, the state can observe (a) the religious group’s 
 
 90. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005); Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971); McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 
(1948); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8–11, 15–16 (1947). 
 91. Professor Brady has conducted further constitutional analysis to make this point and 
concluded that “the only effective and workable protection for the ability of religious groups to 
preserve, transmit, and develop their beliefs free from government interference is a broad right 
of church autonomy that extends to all aspects of church affairs.” Brady, supra note 33, at 
1698. 
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acceptance of state aid,92 and (b) whether the institution chooses to 
provide services to the community at large instead of some smaller 
religious subset. Table 1 helps describe the notion that different 
types of religious institutions have different degrees of religious 
exclusivity. A religious institution may fit anywhere on the spectrum 
below, depending on how it chooses to interact with its community 
and the state. 
Underlying this spectrum of religious exclusivity is the “crucial 
distinction between public and private realms.”93 Public institutions 
provide socially important goods and services, including commercial 
goods and services, directly to both religious and non-religious 
individuals.94 They are very inclusive, opening doors to the general 
 
 92. This formula leaves open the question of whether tax exemptions are considered 
state aid and how that might affect determinations of how much an institution is benefiting 
from the government, but that is beyond the scope of this Comment. For now, the focus is 
when the institution is affirmatively getting something from the state. 
 93. Professor Lupu has argued that “the crucial distinction between public and private 
realms” helps discern procedurally fair religious exemptions from unfair ones. The distinction 
“reflects widely shared and legally embodied beliefs about the exercise of authority by 
individuals, intermediate associations, and state institutions.” Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, 
Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 274, 280–82 
(2010). 
 94. The recognition of “public institutions” in American jurisprudence dates back to the 
Early National Era. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (recognizing the right of the 
federal government to create a national bank in order to fulfill public purposes); see also Van 
Reed v. People’s Nat’l Bank of Lebanon, 198 U.S. 554, 557 (1905) (recognizing private 
banks as quasi-public institutions). While U.S. courts have formulated various tests for 
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public and often accepting state aid to finance their services.95 The 
more a religious group chooses to behave like a completely public 
institution, the more it enmeshes itself with the secular world and 
relinquishes some actual power to set its own agenda. It forgoes life 
on an island in order to interact with outsiders. It invites the public 
into its sphere.96 Private institutions generally do not serve the public 
at large but rather serve the interests of a selective, exclusive set of 
individuals. A truly private institution is self-sustaining, thriving 
without government aid or interaction with outsiders. The more a 
religious group behaves like a private institution, by choosing to 
keep out of the public sphere, the more it secludes itself from the 
secular world and maintains actual power of self-governance.97 
Conversely, the more a religious group acts as a public institution, 
the more it should be subjected to society’s general laws. As a 
positive matter, many religious institutions are semi-public or semi-
private. 
By objectively evaluating a group’s religious exclusivity, 
lawmakers may describe positive differences between various types of 
religious institutions without substantively limiting the definition of 
“religion.” As they recognize and identify the objective factors that 
distinguish a church qua church from a church-owned megamall, 
lawmakers become capable of employing a procedurally fair 
balancing test. Professor Laycock has explained:  
 
identifying public institutions, see, for example, Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968). I 
use “public institution” in a broad sense, as a reference to an entity that provides goods or 
services to all members of society at large. Thus there are varying degrees of publicness, and I 
adopt the understanding expressed by Mark Chopko: “Borrowing from a sociological notion 
of public institutions, there are certain organizing or mediating structures—government, 
religious organizations, private charities, the military, and similar organizations—that have 
socializing roles, internal governance and ritual, and other factors that set them apart from the 
rest of society. These so-called ‘public institutions’ all serve one or another important purpose 
for society. The importance of these institutions is that they interact with one another to create 
an equilibrium among socializing agents.” Mark E. Chopko, Religious Access to Public 
Programs and Governmental Funding, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 645, 661–62 (1992) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 95. Chopko, supra note 94. 
 96. In other words, “[t]he distinction between public and private focuses on the scope 
of invitation and the character of the use.” Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 93, at 283. 
 97. Groups and individuals forgo some actual power upon becoming involved in society 
because society itself is a larger group that exerts domineering power over its constituents. It is 
not simply the presence of general and neutral law that causes people and groups to conform. 
Rather, the existential human condition requires groups and individuals to follow certain 
norms in order to fit into society. 
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The text of the Constitution applies to all forms of religious 
practice, central or peripheral. Still, the argument against 
oppression is strongest with respect to the most important religious 
practices, and weaker with respect to marginal practices that 
believers might be willing to give up. But the importance of 
religious practices varies from person to person, and is difficult for 
courts to assess.98 
That is, the difference between a church and a church-owned 
commercial megamall seems intuitively obvious but difficult to 
describe without simply declaring that a megamall is less “religious” 
than a church. The religious exclusivity approach helps ameliorate this 
difficulty by respecting both church autonomy and its limits. It leaves 
room for groups to control the degree of autonomy to which they 
are entitled. 
If, for example, a church-affiliated adoption agency feels 
threatened by antidiscrimination laws and desires total autonomy to 
discriminate against homosexual couples, it can always stop accepting 
state funding and hold itself out as an exclusive religious group that 
serves church members only.99 An objective focus on religious 
exclusivity also helps lawmakers and scholars identify areas where 
religious externalities will likely arise. The more non-religious 
individuals are served by or work for an institution, the more likely 
non-members will incur direct and unique burdens. In other words 
the more inclusive and public the institution, the less entitled it is to 
an exemption because it has deliberately relinquished some actual 
(not just legal) power of self-governance. The group is behaving less 
like a vehicle for individual free exercise and more like a charity group. 
B. Measuring Group Autonomy Costs 
 The most direct cost of institutional exemptions is their toll on 
individual free exercise and due process rights. Individual rights to 
 
 98. Laycock, supra note 1, at 151. 
 99. A religious exemption for such an agency still may not be justified, as discussed 
below, if non-religious individuals have no market alternatives for adoption. I also recognize 
the theoretical risk here that public institutions will flee the market, leaving a gap in the public 
services sector. But the governing principle in my paradigm is that churches must make 
themselves autonomous if they want the benefits of autonomy. They cannot have their cake 
and eat it too. If a group refuses to recognize restrictive state power in certain realms of group 
activity, the group should not be allowed to cherry pick the fruits of liberating state power 
either. Professor Lupu has recognized this principle. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 27. 
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personal autonomy, equal access, and equal opportunity are all 
threatened by group dominance. On the costs side of the scale, then, 
lawmakers must evaluate the degree to which an exemption 
jeopardizes personal autonomy; because risks to personal autonomy 
and other individual rights can be mitigated by voluntary, knowing 
consent,100 lawmakers must consider the voluntariness of an 
individual’s interaction with the religious group. If an individual has 
total control over his or her involvement with a religious group, the 
potential cost of oppression is minimized because the individual is 
empowered to leave the group. State regulation may be unnecessary, 
and exemptions may be granted more liberally, when interactions 
between the individual and group are knowing and consensual. Key 
indicators of voluntariness, or an individual’s control and consent, 
are (a) information symmetry101 and (b) access to alternative 
institutions in the market. The more an individual is coerced into 
dealing with a group, the more state regulation may be necessary. 
Interactions with groups can thus be described along a spectrum of 
voluntariness as described in Table 2. 
 
 100. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. 
REV. 269 (1986). 
 101. Economists frequently refer to “information asymmetry,” or “imperfect 
information,” as a phenomenon wherein “the managers of the firm know more about the firm 
than the market.” Nathalie Dierkens, Information Asymmetry and Equity Issues, 26 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS. 181, 182 (1991). Qualitative economic research has long indicated 
that information asymmetry makes individual participants in a market “worse off” than they 
would be in a market without information symmetry. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 
Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect 
Information, 90 Q. J. ECON. 629, 638 (1976). 
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Lawmakers must ask whether individuals know about the 
religious institution’s practices and can willfully choose that 
institution over others. Individuals are less likely to be coerced by 
group power, and costs of institutional exemptions are more likely to 
be minimized, when groups are forthcoming about institutional 
norms and standards.102 When a church terminates an employee for 
moral misconduct such as adultery, for example, the employee might 
have a strong claim that her equal protection rights were violated if 
the church’s action was arbitrary and not forewarned. The 
employee’s claim will be weaker if she was fully informed of and 
consented to the employer’s specific policy regarding adultery upon 
being hired. The nature of the employee’s position in the company 
and ability to seek alternate employment is also an important 
consideration. Individual autonomy is likely to be diminished when 
 
 102. Professor Lupu recognizes this in the context of religious exemptions from 
antidiscrimination ordinances protecting gay families. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 93. 
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market alternatives are limited. The cost of exemptions will be high, 
and the individual’s interaction with the group involuntary, when an 
individual is physically or economically compelled to seek public 
services from one particular religious group. A pregnant woman’s 
interactions with a church-owned hospital, for example, may be fairly 
involuntary—and the cost of healthcare exemptions high—when she 
is hemorrhaging and financially or geographically unable to engage 
another emergency healthcare provider. 
V. INTERACTING VARIABLES 
A brief analysis of some specific institutional exemptions may 
illustrate how the above-described costs and benefits come together 
in a balancing test. Table 3 visually describes how group autonomy 
considerations overlay personal autonomy considerations. 
 Cases where the costs of exemptions are high and the benefits 
low, or vice versa, seem fairly straightforward to resolve. Assuming 
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one can determine both group exclusivity and how voluntary an 
individuals’ encounter with that group is,103 public policy will favor 
exemptions when benefits outweigh costs. An example of the former 
scenario is where churches seek exemption from state law requiring 
general recognition of same-sex marriage. A statutory exemption in 
Connecticut, for example, provides “[n]o church or qualified 
church-controlled organization . . . shall be required to participate in 
a ceremony solemnizing a marriage in violation of the religious 
beliefs of that church or qualified church-controlled 
organization.”104 Setting aside the question of what constitutes a 
qualified church-controlled organization under Connecticut law, the 
exemption targets the church qua church. Religious autonomy 
justifications for the exemption are high because a church is a highly 
exclusive sort of religious group. Personal autonomy costs of the 
exemption are probably low because the individuals affected by the 
exemption can find other groups to solemnize their marriage and are 
probably well aware that some churches may choose not to 
solemnize same-sex marriages. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius provides a counterexample 
where a privately held corporation sought religious exemption from 
a health insurance provision mandate.105 The costs of the exemption 
outweigh the benefits. Hobby Lobby alleged that unless it was 
exempted from the HHS contraceptive mandate it would “be 
required, contrary to the [store owners’] religious beliefs, to provide 
insurance coverage for certain drugs and devices that the applicants 
believe can cause abortions.”106 Religious group autonomy 
justifications for the exemption are weak because the exemption 
benefits a very inclusive commercial institution that opens its doors 
to the public. The institution itself serves customers in more than 
five hundred commercial retail stores nationwide,107 and it has not 
held itself out as a members-only group. Costs of the exemption are 
high because individuals have limited control over their relationships 
with employers. Individuals are, in a sense, coerced into interacting 
 
 103. See supra Part II. 
 104. An Act Implementing the Guarantee of Equal Protection under the Constitution of 
the State for Same Sex Couples, 2009 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 09-13, § 7(a)–(b), available at 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2009/ACT/PA/2009PA-00013-R00SB-00899-PA.htm. 
 105. 133 S. Ct. 641, 642 (2012). 
 106. Id. at 642. 
 107. Id. at 642. 
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with their employer—especially in matters of healthcare benefits—
because they have limited alternative means of obtaining health 
insurance. Moreover, the court record did not indicate that Hobby 
Lobby employees were expressly informed of the institution’s 
religious objections to underwriting certain employee insurance 
policies;108 employees thus cannot have consented to the idea that by 
working for a Christian boss they might be denied possible HHS-
mandated healthcare benefits.109 The cost-benefits balancing test 
thus disfavors a religious exemption for Hobby Lobby and other 
commercial businesses from the HHS contraceptive mandate. 
Somewhat more difficult to parse are scenarios involving equally 
high or equally low costs and benefits of exemptions. In these cases, 
determinations of exclusivity and voluntariness may seem somewhat 
less objective. Nevertheless, the balancing test may still prove useful 
in difficult employment and healthcare cases. 
A. The Employment Cases 
Consider the scenario in Hosanna-Tabor. A teacher at a church-
owned school was fired for “insubordination and disruptive 
behavior,” uncannily at the same time she was diagnosed with 
narcolepsy and had taken disability leave. Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church owned and operated a K–8 Lutheran 
school that routinely hired “lay” teachers to teach secular subjects 
and hired “called” teachers to teach religious subjects and perform 
other pastoral functions.110 As in the Hobby Lobby case, the toll of 
an exemption on personal autonomy seems high because the affected 
employee is vulnerable to her employer’s actions. The affected 
individual here lacks control over her relationship with the group 
because she is somewhat economically powerless to simply find a 
replacement employer in the market. Indeed, the very fact that she 
 
 108. Id. at 642. In fact, Hobby Lobby’s sudden desire to withhold certain healthcare 
benefits might have appeared arbitrary to employees. The company never denied that it “has 
no moral objection to the use of preventive contraceptives and will continue its longstanding 
practice of covering these preventive contraceptives for its employees,” but began objecting to 
mandatory coverage of other contraceptives after the HHS mandate was passed. See Case 
Synopsis of Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, 
http://www.becketfund.org/hobbylobby. 
 109. See Case Synopsis of Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, 
http://www.becketfund.org/hobbylobby. 
 110. EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 582 F. Supp. 2d 
881 (E.D. Mich. 2008). 
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brought suit and fought for her job indicates that she lacks control. 
The employee also lacks the protection of forewarning. The religious 
group failed to give employees advance notice of any intent, power, 
or authority to disregard ADA provisions that employees ordinarily 
and reasonably expect employers in society to follow.111 
Although the Court held the employer’s actions permissible 
under a judicially enacted “ministerial exception,”112 the balancing 
test implies that the costs of the employer’s actions outweigh the 
benefits in this scenario. The employee has a fairly low degree of 
voluntariness or control over her relationship with the school. The 
costs of a ministerial exemption are high. At the same time, the 
benefits of a ministerial exemption are high. Church-owned schools 
can be very exclusive and private. It is not clear whether the 
Hosanna-Tabor school served a broad group of students in the 
community or received public aid, and more information is necessary 
in a close call like this to make an evaluation about public policy. The 
church did at least hire some non-religious individuals and thereby 
decreased its exclusivity somewhat. It also held itself out to the 
public as a group that is, in at least some ways, a secular 
institution.113 Barring more information, the balancing test thus 
implies that Hosanna-Tabor Court probably should not have excused 
the employer’s conduct under a religious exemption. 
Conversely, exemptions to employment laws may sometimes be 
fair when church employees are fired for violating the church’s code 
of moral conduct in their personal lives.114 Consider the Mormon 
Public Affairs official who was fired for having an extramarital 
affair.115 The group involved here is a church itself, an extremely 
private and autonomous religious institution, so justifications for an 
exemption are high. The individual is vulnerable to some coercion 
and unable to control his relationship with his employer because of 
the hierarchical nature of employer-employee relationships. Yet the 
 
 111. See EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 
782 (6th Cir. 2010) (explaining that the school’s personnel manual actually implied that 
teachers would enjoy ordinary ADA protections). 
 112. The ministerial exception “bar[s] certain employment against religious institutions” 
and is “rooted in the First Amendment’s guarantees of religious freedom.” Hosanna-Tabor, 
133 S. Ct. at 644. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Obst v. Germany, 425/03 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng-press/pages/search.aspx?i=003-3272505-3650095. 
 115. Id. at 2. 
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employee was fully informed before the incident that he could lose 
his job over moral infractions.116 The individual thus had a fair 
degree of control over his relationship with the church, so church-
group considerations edge out individual ones. Because church 
exclusivity is at its highest possible level while there is complete 
information symmetry on the individual’s side of the scale, the 
proposed balancing test indicates that the church should win the 
fight for an exemption. 
B. The Healthcare Cases 
 Healthcare scenarios also reveal the merits of the balancing test. 
Kathleen Prieskorn had a miscarriage and rushed to the nearest 
hospital, which happened to be a Catholic hospital.117 The doctor at 
the hospital determined that Kathleen urgently needed a uterine 
evacuation, but hospital policy prohibited the evacuation because a 
fetal heartbeat was still present. The next closest hospital was 80 
miles away. The Catholic Church has a strong policy against 
abortion of any kind.118 Should the hospital be exempt from ordinary 
medical standards requiring it to perform the evacuation? Again, 
more details about the specific hospital’s practices may be needed to 
fairly weigh autonomy considerations. The church may alter 
hypothetical outcomes in exemption cases by changing how it holds 
itself out to the public, and this is one strength of the exclusion 
approach to institutions.119 Yet barring additional information, it 
seems that a Catholic hospital that houses the only emergency 
department in an eighty mile radius is highly likely to be a public 
 
 116. Id. (“[Obst] held various positions within the Mormon church . . . given his long 
career with the Church, Mr. Obst must have been aware of the severity of his misconduct.”). 
 117. Ginty, supra note 70. 
 118. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ethical and Religious Directives for 
Catholic Health Care Services, UCCSB (Nov. 17, 2009) http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-
action/human-life-and-dignity/health-care/upload/Ethical-Religious-Directives-Catholic-
Health-Care-Services-fifth-edition-2009.pdf. 
 119. Under the balancing advocated in Parts II and III, supra, church hospitals are more 
likely to enjoy the benefits of religious exemptions if they are more exclusive or private and less 
public. This is ironic in one sense, since the whole reason why many churches operate hospitals 
is that delineate medicine is one field of particular religious significance; the church’s 
determination of religious priorities does not really match up with the exclusivity 
determination advocated here. And if they are not granted exemptions when their beliefs are at 
odds with secular society, they may simply leave the market altogether. Yet in another sense, 
society’s hefty interest in guaranteeing safe healthcare to patients who rely on it may rival the 
church group’s interest in abstaining from what it considers immoral behavior. 
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institution. Given the reasonable assumption that the hospital 
accepts public aid and serves a broad base of both religious and non-
religious customers,120 justifications for an exemption are minimal.121 
The costs of the exemption are great. The individual has very little 
control over her interactions with the group but is coerced by a 
physical emergency to seek help from it. The fact that the individual 
has very limited market alternatives exacerbates the element of 
coercion in this interaction. The balancing test thus disfavors an 
exemption here. 
Suppose in another case that a woman sues a church-owned 
insurance company for failing to pay for her elective abortion.122 The 
insurance company provides health insurance to employees of 
organizations affiliated with the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints.123 The insurance company is a nonprofit organization distinct 
from the church, but funded by the church. Given the church’s 
exclusive behavior and the fact that it participates very little in the 
public sphere, justifications for an exemption are high. The costs of 
an exemption are more difficult to determine. Inquiry into how 
much control a woman has or how “voluntary” abortion is tends to 
be highly controversial.124 This example thus highlights one of the 
major shortcomings of balancing approaches in general: they 
necessarily require some arbitrary and subjective discretion. It also 
illustrates that some dynamics between groups and individuals simply 
 
 120. Past studies by MergerWatch have indicated that “[r]eligiously-sponsored hospitals 
serve and employ people from a wide variety of faiths and—as this study has demonstrated— 
rely heavily on public funding.” No Strings Attached: Public Funding of Religiously Sponsored 
Hospitals in the United States, THE MERGERWATCH PROJECT HIGHLIGHTS (2002), available 
at http://www.mergerwatch.org/storage/pdf-files/bp_no_strings.pdf. 
 121. Again, this seems ironic because abortion is a deeply religious issue and abortion 
laws are peppered with religious exemptions. However the mere fact that institutional 
exemptions have little justification in instances where a religious healthcare group is a 
community’s sole provider does not mean that they are never justified. The hospital can 
physically relocate to a different location or take greater care to not to situate itself as the only 
healthcare provider in a remote area unless it is willing to provide all services required by 
patients. Moreover, individual exemptions may help protect religious liberty for doctors and 
other individuals within Catholic institutions. 
 122. Katherine A. White analyzes several such cases. Katherine A. White, Crisis of 
Conscience: Reconciling Religious Health Care Providers’ Beliefs and Patients’ Rights, 51 STAN. 
L. REV. 1703 (1999). 
 123. See id. at 1741 (describing Deseret Mutual Benefits Association as such an 
insurance company). 
 124. Daniel K. Williams, No Happy Medium: The Role of Americans’ Ambivalent View of 
Fetal Rights in Political Conflict over Abortion Legalization, 25 J. POL’Y HIST. 42 (2013). 
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cannot be captured by a catch-all theory of exemptions. Yet attempts 
to measure institutional exclusivity and individual control may at 
least help clarify some of the dynamics at play. Here, the individual 
can probably find alternative abortion providers in the market and 
pay them out-of-pocket if her insurance company denies coverage. 
Also, she was probably well aware upon entering a relationship with 
the religious employer and church-owned insurance organization 
that abortion services would not be covered. Costs of an exemption 
are probably low. The exemption is probably fair from a costs-
benefits standpoint. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Legal controversy surrounding institutional religious exemptions, 
exceptions for church-affiliated organizations from neutral and 
generally applicable laws, is thriving. Supporters have argued that 
institutional exemptions are crucial to safeguarding free exercise 
rights for religious individuals. Critics have decried institutional 
exemptions’ shielding of religious organizations from important civil 
rights safeguards. There is no one-size-fits-all solution to the 
controversy; supporters and critics alike have found, at times, ample 
justification for their respective positions. On one hand, institutional 
exemptions can protect religious freedom by providing a vehicle for 
free exercise and by advancing democratic goals of pluralism. On the 
other, they threaten to subvert personal autonomy by insulating 
church-affiliated institutions from laws designed to protect 
individuals from abuses of group power. 
One solution is a balancing test that weighs the benefits of 
institutional exemptions, namely group autonomy, against the costs, 
subversion of personal autonomy. Courts must evaluate religious 
exclusivity, the degree to which an organization accepts state aid 
and/or holds itself out as publicly accessibly, in order to objectively 
measure an exemption’s potential free exercise benefits. They must 
also consider voluntariness, or the degree to which an individual 
interacting with a religious institution has access to information 
and/or to market alternatives, in order to measure potential costs. 
Costs and benefits of institutional exemptions are difficult to 
measure and will vary widely in different contexts. And all balancing 
tests are vulnerable to some abuse by judges. Yet objective 
considerations of religious exclusivity and voluntariness can help 
courts achieve more procedurally fair results. The balancing test 
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outlined in this Comment helps resolve a core element of the 
exemption dilemma. It articulates the conceptual framework by 
which institutional exemptions should be analyzed. It introduces a 
new way to measure the desirability of institutional exemptions 
generally without substantively defining religion or deferring too 
broadly to religious group power. 
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